Judicial L'Awesomeness: Use of a Firearm

Being new to the whole legal thing, I've already been pleasantly surprised to be required to read court opinions that, within the text, display short little snippets of awesomeness. Since they have to do with the law in general, and because my Legal Analysis (heretofore intended to be read (for the sake of my own immaturity) as Legal Analcyst) professor often used the term "awesomeness," I'll take my own student right (like an artist taking artistic right, or whatever) and refer to these little snippets I find in my readings as Judicial L'Awesomeness; a direct quote from a justice that I think is completely awesome for its linguistic quality.

This will be hopefully the first of many. I will also not bother to give much, if any, introduction to the case because these snippets of Judicial L'Awesomeness are probably best read somewhat out of context.

Taken from the Supreme Court of the United States case John Angus Smith v. United States, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, writing the opinion of the Court, says:

We are not persuaded that our construction of the phrase "uses...a firearm" will produce anomalous applications. See post, at 2 (example of using a gun to scratch one's head). As we already have noted, see supra, at 4, and will explain in greater detail later, infra, at 14-16, 924(c)(1) requires not only that the defendant "use" the firearm, but also that he use it "during and in relation to" the drug trafficking crime. As a result, the defendant who "uses" a firearm to scratch his head, see post, at 2, or for some other innocuous purpose, would avoid punishment for that conduct altogether: although scratching one's head with a gun might constitute "use," that action cannot support punishment under 924(c)(1) unless it facilitates or furthers the drug crime; that the firearm served to relieve an itch is not enough...While pistol-whipping a victim with a firearm might be "more than" brandishing, scratching one's head is not.

In any event, the "intended purpose" of a firearm is not that it be used in any offensive manner whatever, but rather that it be used in a particular fashion - by firing it. The dissent's contention therefore cannot be that the defendant must use the firearm "as a weapon," but rather that he must fire it or threaten to fire it, "as a gun." Under the dissent's approach, then, even the criminal who pistol-whips his victim has not used a firearm within the meaning of 924(c)(1), for firearms are intended to be fired or brandished, not used as bludgeons. It appears that the dissent similarly would limit the scope of the "othe[r] use[s]" covered by USSG 2B3.1(b)(2)(B). The universal view of the courts of appeals, however, is directly to the contrary. No court of appeals ever has held that using a gun to pistol-whip a victim is anything but the "use" of a firearm; nor has any court ever held that trading a firearm for drugs falls short of being the "use" thereof. 

Justice O'Connor must have some sense of humor to even imagine a person using a gun to "scratch one's head." I applaud her use of imagination and whit to include "scratching one's head" and "pistol-whipping" as potential uses of a firearm and vow, from now on, that when I have an itch that needs relieving, in as much as I'm not committing a drug-trafficking crime, I will use my pistol to scratch that itch good and long. Awesomeness, no?